DTN News - SPECIAL REPORT ON SENKAKU ISLANDS: Is The Senkaku Island Dispute All Just A Huge Conspiracy?

DTN News - SPECIAL REPORT ON SENKAKU ISLANDS: Is The Senkaku Island Dispute All Just A Huge Conspiracy?

Source: DTN News - - This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources By John
(NSI News Source Info) TORONTO, Canada - September 25, 2012: The Senkaku Island dispute has been blowing up again lately and the media is all ablaze with anti-Japanese protests in China. Japanese businesses are being vandalized, Japanese cars destroyed, and all sorts of crazy nonsense has been going down over there lately. So why are the Senkaku Islands so important to these countries and who do they really belong to?

Luckily for you, I’ve done extensive research, cracked the case, and can say with utmost certainty who has the rights to lay claim to the islands.

THE SENKAKU ISLANDS AND HOW IT ALL BEGAN

Before this whole deal made its way into the media, I didn’t really know much about the Senkaku Island debate, let alone where these islands were. The Senkaku Islands, or Diaoyu as they are known in China, are a group of five uninhabited islands and three barren rocks located in the East China Sea between Japan, Taiwan, and China, with all three countries laying claim to them.

Following the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese government formally annexed what was known as the Ryukyu Kingdom as Okinawa Prefecture in 1879. The Senkaku Islands, which lay between the Ryukyu Kingdom and the Chinese Qing Empire, became the boundary between the two nations.

In 1885, Japan considered taking formal control of the Senkaku Islands. However, the islands had been given Chinese names, Chinese newspapers were claiming that Japan was occupying islands off of China’s coast, and Japan just didn’t really want to make the Qing Empire suspicious of anything by annexing the islands. As such, the request to initiate formal control over the islands was rejected.

In 1895, during the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan decided to incorporate the islands under the administration of Okinawa, stating that it had been conducting surveys there since 1884 and that the islands effectively didn’t belong to anyone, with there being no evidence to suggest that they had ever been under the Qing Empire’s control.

After China lost the Sino-Japanese War, both countries signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki which stated that China would surrender the island of Taiwan together with all islands appertaining or belonging to said island of Taiwan.

The tricky part here is that there was no agreement as to who had control over the Senkaku Islands prior to this, so it is debatable as to whether or not the Senkaku Islands were actually included as part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. This detail is important because the treaty was rendered moot when Japan lost World War II in 1945. The Treaty of San Francisco nullified prior treaties concerning the area.

Like I said, there is a disagreement between the Japanese, Chinese, and Taiwanese governments as to whether or not the islands are implied to be part of the “islands appertaining or belonging to said island of Taiwan” in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. China and Taiwan both dispute the Japanese claim to the island by citing Japan’s abovementioned reasons to turn down the request to incorporate the islands in 1885. Both China and Taiwan assert sovereignty over the islands.

THE COVERUP

Unfortunately for Japan and China, the abovementioned history means absolutely nothing. Through my extensively painstaking research on the topic, I uncovered the greatest government conspiracy coverup fiasco known to man. Neither Japan, China, or Taiwan have the right to claim the Senkaku Islands as their own.

I discovered that shortly after Lithuania’s personal union with Poland in 1386, a brave and handsome Lithuanian man set out on a sailing expedition from the port city of Klaipėda in search of fame and fortune. Tragically, the ships did not return for they had become irreparably damaged and moored on a rocky, uninhabited archipelago in a strange and distant sea.

The captain of the ship detailed the landscape and surroundings in his journal as he slowly passed away from starvation. He wrote of his dreams and aspirations, his love for his country, and claimed the archipelago in the name of his family.

This man was my ancestor. I traced back the lineage and I found that I am the true heir to the Senkaku Islands. Both the Chinese and Japanese governments know this and they’ve tried to hide the fact that the islands belong to me and my family with their made up histories and elaborate fairy tales. I profess that I am the only one who may rightfully lay claim to these lands. I declare myself high king of the Senkaku Islands.

But just for fun, let’s explore why China and Japan think that they have the right to claim the area and not me.

THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

The Senkaku Islands are currently administered by Japan, but Taiwan and China both lay claim to them as well. The United States occupied the islands after World War II from 1945 to 1972 and even though they do not have an official position on the validity of the competing sovereignty claims, the islands are included within the U.S. Japan Security Treaty. This means that if Japan needed to defend the islands, it would be likely to compel action by the United States military.

Both China and Japan indicated their sovereignty claims with respect to the islands to the United Nations Security Council at the time of the US transfer of its administrative powers to Japan after its occupation in 1972. Sovereignty over the islands would give Japan exclusive oil, mineral, and fishing rights in surrounding waters.

Basically what happened was that the US handed the islands over to Japan, and China wasn’t too happy about it because they believed it should be placed in their hands, not Japan’s.

CHINA’S CLAIM TO THE ISLANDS

It seems that China really didn’t put up too much of a fuss about these islands until after it was discovered that there might be oil reserves under the sea surrounding the islands. The study was conducted in 1968, and the Chinese started getting really adamant over their claims to the region shortly thereafter, especially with the US choice to hand control of the region over to Japan. From the Chinese perspective, this is what it looks like for the Senkaku Islands.

1. China claims the discovery of the islands for themselves, citing early recordings of such in old maps and travelogues.

2. The islands were China’s frontier off-shore defense against wakou (Japanese pirates) during the Ming and Qing dynasties (1368-1911) and an old Chinese map of Asia as well as a map compiled by a Japanese cartographer in the 18th century show the islands as being a part of China.

3. As mentioned above, Japan took control of the islands during the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895 by means of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. But a letter from the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1885 warning against annexing the islands due to anxiety about China’s response, shows, in China’s opinion, that Japan knew the islands were not actually “up for grabs.”

4. The Potsdam Declaration stated that “Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine,” with “we” being the victors of the Second World War, including the Republic of China. Japan accepted the terms of the Declaration when it surrendered and China sees this as a reason for stating they have rights to the islands in question.

5. Both China and Taiwan never endorsed the US transfer of the islands to Japan in 1970s.

JAPAN’S CLAIM TO THE ISLANDS

The Japanese stance on the issue is that there isn’t even an issue at all. Japan believes that there is no territorial issue that needs to be resolved over the Senkaku Islands whatsoever. In a counter to the abovementioned Chinese points, Japan has stated the following.

1. According to Japan, the islands have been uninhabited and have showed no trace of being under Chinese control prior to 1895.

2. The islands were neither part of Taiwan nor part of the Pescadores Islands, which were ceded to Japan by the Qing Dynasty in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Therefore, the Japanese believe their claim to the islands was not affected by the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

3. Though the islands were controlled by the United States as an occupying power between 1945 and 1972, Japan was given and has exercised administration over the islands ever since.

4. Taiwan and China only started claiming ownership of the islands in 1971, following a May 1969 United Nations report that a large oil and gas reserve may exist under the seabed near the islands.

So, as one can see – they are simply bickering over lands that they have no legitimate stake in. Those islands are mine and I’m considering submitting a formal complaint of sorts, but I fear that without widespread worldwide support, I will fall victim to the same fate as many Japanese businesses and establishments in China as I’m sure the validity of my claim will be questioned.

THE ANTI-JAPANESE DEMONSTRATIONS

Over the years there have been plenty of demonstrations concerning the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands. Lately, there’s been a resurgence of them in China, mostly due to Shintaro Ishihara’s decision to let Tokyo Municipality purchase three of the Senkaku islands from their current Japanese owners (the Kurihara family), placing them under state control. The Chinese government angrily protested, stating, “No one will ever be permitted to buy and sell China’s sacred territory.”

On August 15th, activists from Hong Kong sailed to and landed on one of the disputed islands, but were stopped by the Japan Coast Guard. The activists and their ship were detained by Japanese authorities and were deported two days later.

China wasn’t happy about this either.

In Beijing, citizens of began protesting in front of the Japanese embassy and protestors called for the return of the Diaoyu Islands and for Japan to confess her crimes. Chinese protestors marched down the streets chanting slogans such as “Defend the Diaoyu Islands” and “Smash Japanese Imperialism.” They called for the boycott of Japanese goods and for the government to retake the islands. Japanese flags were defaced, Japanese cars were smashed, and shops selling Japanese goods were vandalized.

According to Sing Tao Daily, the Chinese government sent in large numbers of armed police, who called for an end to the violent protests, drove the protesters away, and detained a handful of them.

The riots are also being condemned by a great amount of Chinese citizens and many are hoping for a soon to be realized peaceful solution as can be seen from posts on Sina Weibo (a Chinese microblogging website akin to a hybrid of Twitter and Facebook, used by well over 30% of Internet users in China with more than 300 million registered users).

When I first saw the horrific scenes, I was so ashamed of my own race, seeming so barbaric and outrageous through the lens, that at one point, I felt that such a lawless nation will never have any hope of becoming a peace-loving superpower that is deserving of respect, and that there is no point of staying in a country that can come to Armageddon so easily.

But after reading posts that have flooded Sina Weibo, most of which vehemently condemned such violence, I realize that while the rabble and the crimes they’ve committed in the name of love for China have irreversibly smeared the image of Chinese people, there are much more people who have utter contempt for them.

-Jing Gao – MinistryOfTofu.com

Currently, the official stance of the involved parties is as follows: China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is urging people to express thoughts “rationally and within the law,” Japan’s Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda wants China to prevent anti-Japan violence, Taiwan is annoyed but being ignored by pretty much everyone, and the United States just wants everybody to calm down.

As one can see, there’s a lot of stuff going on and the people and the governments are trying to figure out the best way to proceed with everything. Normally, I wouldn’t take a stance on these sorts of situations as they’re usually not entirely black and white cases, but these islands are obviously mine to claim. This I know for sure. Another thing I know for sure is that it’s a bad time to be the owner of Japanese goods in China with all the riots going on. Yikes.

ACTUALLY, THIS HAPPENS A LOT

Unfortunately, territorial disputes are a pretty common thing between Taiwan, China, Japan, Korea, and other Asian countries. Koichi actually wrote about this a while ago in his post about all the current land disputes Japan is involved in.

Just recently at the London Olympic games a South Korean player got in big trouble for displaying a sign with a slogan supporting South Korean sovereignty over disputed islets that are claimed by both South Korea and Japan (called Dokdo in South Korean and Takeshima in Japan). There’s a small chance that these islets belong to my family as well, but I won’t get into that here.

And then of course there’s the whole China/Taiwan deal along with a slew of countless other issues plaguing the region. It would seem that territorial disputes are more rampant in the Asia Pacific are than any other, a full list of which can be found here. I’m sure there will always be plenty of disputes regarding the lands in the area, especially when they’re uninhabited islands such as the Senkaku. My only hope is that the issues can be resolved peacefully.

I’m not even going to get into all the other supposed stakes my family has in distant lands that are currently up for dispute, but here’s where you come in. I need you to help rally support for the cause and get the Senkaku Islands back into their rightful hands. Mine.

---

So tell me, what are your thoughts on the whole Senkaku Island dispute? Any important details I forgot to touch on? Who do you think has the most valid claim to the islands – Japan, China, Taiwan, or yours truly? What do you think should be done to resolve the issue at hand? Let us know in the comments!

Sites Referenced:
Senkaku Islands Wikipedia
2012 China Anti-Japanese Demonstrations Wikipedia

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*Link for This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources By John
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DTN News - DISPUTED SOUTH CHINA SEA REGION: Philippines Accuses China Of Deploying 100 Ships In Scarborough Shoal

DTN News - DISPUTED SOUTH CHINA SEA REGION: Philippines Accuses China Of Deploying 100 Ships In Scarborough Shoal
**China in territorial disputes with all of its neighboring countries
Source: DTN News - - This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources Guardian UK
(NSI News Source Info) TORONTO, Canada - May 26, 2012: There are now 92 Chinese ships at Panatag.

The Philippines accused China on Wednesday of flaring tensions anew by sending more government and fishing vessels to Scarborough (Panatag) Shoal despite ongoing talks to resolve the two-month-old standoff.

Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) spokesperson Raul Hernandez said the number of Chinese vessels at Scarborough Shoal increased to 92 from 77 on Tuesday. They included four government ships and fishing and utility boats.

Hernandez said the Philippines had only two vessels in the area, which both countries claim.

Hernandez said the DFA handed Chinese Ambassador Ma Keqing a diplomatic note on Monday to protest the presence on that day of 77 Chinese vessels-five government ships, 16 fishing boats and 56 dinghies used to load fish or corals.

A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, Hong Lei, on Wednesday said that nearly 100 Chinese boats or dinghies arrived at the shoal.

"The Philippine side has recently taken some provocative actions in the Huangyan Island waters, thus the Chinese side has adopted corresponding measures to strengthen management and control," Hong said, using China's name for Scarborough Shoal.

"To our knowledge, now there are about 20 Chinese fishing boats working in that area. This number is roughly the same with that in the same period of the previous years," Hong said.

"The way these fishing boats are working complies with the related Chinese laws and the fishing moratorium issued by the Chinese government," he added.

Hernandez said that despite China's fishing ban, Chinese vessels were observed fishing and collecting protected corals at the shoal.

The Philippines has separately imposed its own ban on fishing in the area.

Seventh protest

Hernandez said the Philippines had filed a seventh diplomatic protest because of China's sending more vessels to the shoal despite ongoing talks to resolve the dispute.

He said that at around 7 p.m. on Monday, there were five Chinese government vessels (CMS 71, CMS 84, FLEC 301, 303 and 310) in the area, which were accompanied by 16 fishing boats (10 inside the lagoon and six outside), and 56 utility boats (27 inside the lagoon and 29 outside).

"Yesterday (Tuesday), there were still 16 Chinese fishing vessels and the number of utility boats went up to 76," Hernandez said

He explained that utility boats were dinghies that helped the fishing boats collect their harvest of giant clams and corals by dredging.

Pullout demanded

Manila demanded an immediate pullout of the vessels, saying they violate Philippine sovereignty and a nonbinding Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea signed by China and Southeast Asian Countries.

"It is regrettable that these actions occurred at a time when China has been articulating for a deescalation of tensions and while the two sides have been discussing how to defuse the situation in the area," Hernandez added.

Both sides claim the uninhabited, horseshoe-shaped shoal, which is 230 kilometers (124 nautical miles) from Zambales province, the nearest Philippine coast.

Hernandez said the Philippines remained committed to defusing the tensions in the area.

He said Assistant Foreign Secretary for Asia-Pacific Affairs Teresa Lazaro and Ambassador Ma were discussing the dispute in Manila while similar talks were going on in Beijing.

The Philippines is also taking the dispute to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (Itlos), but China rejects international arbitration.

China also opposes the intervention of other countries in its territorial dispute with the Philippines.

"The Philippines' attempt to draw any third party into interfering or intervening through whatever means in the incident is bound to further escalate the situation or even change the nature of the issue and will meet steadfast opposition from the Chinese side," Hong said.

Hong was referring to Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario's earlier statement that some countries were helping the Philippines establish a "minimum credible defense posture" by providing the country with patrol boats and military aircraft to complement its diplomatic initiative in dealing with China.

According to Hong, "the Chinese side has been actively engaged in diplomatic consultation to urge the Philippine side to correct its wrongdoing and ease the situation, for the sake of normal growth of bilateral relations."

"China's principles and stance over the Huangyan Island issue are clear-cut," Hong said. "Huangyan Island has always been China's territory, and China possesses indisputable sovereignty over the island. The Philippine side should concretely respect China's territorial sovereignty. At the same time, China's position of committing to diplomatic consultation to address the current situation remains unchanged."

Hernandez said "the plan [to establish a minimum credible defense posture] has been there for a long time."

"We have to substantiate our diplomatic capacity with a minimum credible defense posture … that is what we're doing. We are trying to upgrade or modernize our military which has been neglected for several years," Hernandez said.

Help from Japan, Korea  

Del Rosario earlier said that Japan would likely provide the country with 10 40-meter patrol boats under its official development aid and two larger ones as grants.

He said South Korea had provided the Armed Forces of the Philippines equipment, such as vests and helmets, under a logistics agreement. "I understand our defense department is looking to possibly purchase aircraft from there," Del Rosario said.

In November last year, President Benigno Aquino III asked visiting South Korean President Lee Myung-bak for aircraft, patrol boats and other hardware to help boost the Philippines' military capability amid tensions with China on the Spratly islands in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea).

Lee's response was not disclosed, but he said Seoul wanted to help Manila resolve its maritime problems.

Del Rosario said the Philippines could expect to receive from Australia "a number of vessels for search and rescue, as well as significant training here and abroad for large numbers of our military" when a status of visiting forces agreement between the two countries is ratified this week.

Earlier, the military announced it would be getting a second Hamilton-class cutter from the United States.

Del Rosario has repeatedly said the country was determined to "improve our national defense by building a minimum credible defense posture."

He said that this year, the Philippines would receive S$160 million (about P6.25 billion) in defense assistance from the United States.

He also said he had secured US funding for a S$70-million (about P2.3 billion) radar system for the Philippine Coast Guard.

The Chinese Embassy in Manila admitted that the People's Liberation Army recently conducted a "regular training program" in the "West Pacific waters."

Citing the Information Office of China's Ministry of Defense, the embassy said, "The recent drill by a naval fleet of China's People's Liberation Army in the West Pacific waters is a regular training program included in its annual plan, not aimed at any particular country or target."

Related News;

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  China and Philippines end fishing standoff
• 11 Apr 2012
  Philippine warship in standoff with China vessels
• 8 May 2012
  China stirs up trouble with Philippines
• 24 Aug 2010
  Philippines hostage deaths draws anger from China over gunman's TV view

*Link for This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources Guardian UK
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DTN News - OBAMA IN AFGHANISTAN: Obama’s Afghanistan Plan - Echoes of Vietnam In The U.S. Exit Strategy

DTN News - OBAMA IN AFGHANISTAN: Obama’s Afghanistan Plan - Echoes of Vietnam In The U.S. Exit Strategy
Source: DTN News - - This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources By Tony Karon - Time (Blog)
(NSI News Source Info) TORONTO, Canada - May 2, 2012: To understand the historical significance of President Barack Obama’s visit to Afghanistan on Tuesday, imagine that President Richard Nixon had, in the spring of 1972, flown to Saigon to signal American voters that the Vietnam war was coming to an end — and to ink a deal with President Nguyen Van Thieu codifying a long-term U.S. relationship with the Republic of South Vietnam, which would shortly be left responsible for its own security. 

“Today, I signed a historic agreement between the United States and Afghanistan that defines a new kind of relationship between our countries – a future in which Afghans are responsible for the security of their nation, and we build an equal partnership between two sovereign states; a future in which the war ends, and a new chapter begins,” Obama said Tuesday.  Nixon might have said something similar on that imaginary 1972 visit. Except, of course, everyone knew that Vietnam’s future would not be defined by an agreement between Washington and Thieu, as much as by the one signed in Paris, two months after Nixon’s reelection, between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, representing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (a.k.a. “North Vietnam”). Even that deal collapsed, of course, with the DRV and its supporters in the south finishing off the Thieu regime 19 months after U.S. troops withdrew.

Any deal between Presidents Obama and Karzai premised on the ability of the current political order in Kabul to protect itself independently of foreign troops is hardly likely to be the last word, pleasing as the spectacle may be for presidential campaign purposes. The key — but by no means the only — conversation shaping Afghanistan’s future will be the one conducted on the battlefield, and at the negotiating table, between the U.S., its Afghan interlocutors and the Taliban. That point seemed to be underscored by a Taliban car bomb attack near U.S. bases in Kabul just hours after Obama’s departure, which served as a counterpoint to the President’s insistence in his speech that the insurgents’ momentum has been broken. 

Sure, the U.S. has made important tactical gains against the Taliban in designated operational areas in southwestern Afghanistan, but tactical gains in an expeditionary counterinsurgency war tend to be just that; the insurgents know that, as Henry Kissinger famously put it, guerrilla armies win by not losing. They know that the civilian population has little faith in Western forces or in the government those forces protect, and they know the U.S. and its allies are seeking an expeditious exit from Afghanistan. The brutal truth of the Afghanistan equation is that time is still on the side of the Taliban.

The U.S. plans to drawn down troop levels from the current 90,000 to less than 20,000 by the end of 2014, while helping Afghan security forces “surge” to an anticipated 352,000 troops this year. The new agreements seemed to signal a ten-year commitment to maintain an unspecified number of troops for training, intelligence and logistics purposes, and to conduct operations against al-Qaeda. (More importantly, the U.S., as well as other NATO countries, will commit later this month to a decade-long financial package to the government in Kabul worth over $4 billion a year, a sum some say Karzai considers insufficient.)

“We will not build permanent bases in this country, nor will we be patrolling in cities and mountains,” Obama said. “That will be the job of the Afghan people.” But so narrow is the political base of the Karzai regime, which was elected by a small minority of Afghans and whose corruption is endemic, that its ability to lead a credible counterinsurgency fight against the Taliban remains seriously in doubt. The problem is not simply that the Afghan forces lack sufficient training, or that the Afghan government can’t afford to pay for the indigenous army that NATO has created to keep it alive; the problem is fundamentally one of motivation. How many Afghan troops are really ready to fight and die to keep President Karzai in power? One troubling indicator might be the by-now routine incidence of Afghan friendlies turning their weapons on their U.S. and other Western mentors — an incidence the AP claims the military is systematically underreporting.

President Obama did, of course, acknowledge that negotiations with the insurgency were underway. “My Administration has been in direct discussions with the Taliban,” he said. “We have made it clear they can be part of this future if they break with al-Qaida, renounce violence and abide by Afghan laws.” The Taliban may negotiate, and they may not — for a range of reasons ranging from mistrust of the U.S. to the fact that they feel the wind at their backs and because they know the Americans will leave, and also because the Taliban is no longer a single hierarchical entity, but a series of networks, with many of the younger commanders who have replaced those killed by U.S. forces in recent years adopting an even more militant and intractable position. The longer the fighting rages on, analysts of the Taliban warn, the less likely it becomes that those more inclined to negotiate a compromise are able to prevail in the movement’s internal debates over those who believe they will win a bigger victory by fighting on.

Still, even if the Taliban was willing to negotiate a political settlement, it’s a relative certainty that the insurgents won’t accept the terms laid down by President Obama: Even if the Taliban was willing to commit to preventing Afghan territory being used to stage international terror attacks, it’s unlikely to accept Afghan laws and a constitution adopted on the back of a Western invasion. Afghanistan had been engaged in a civil war for a decade before the U.S.-led invasion prompted by the 9/11 attacks, and the invasion didn’t change that; it simply tipped the balance in that civil war against the Pakistan-backed and predominantly Pashtun Taliban and in favor of the Northern Alliance, dominated by ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, and backed by India, Iran and Russia. It is the Northern Alliance that forms the basis of the current order in Kabul, but take Western troops out of the equation, and the equation changes. The Taliban would only be likely to accept the Karzai order in Kabul if it had lost the war; right now, that’s not happening, meaning that a political solution is unlikely without a substantial renegotiation of the distribution of power. The likelihood that the Taliban will reconcile itself to a lesser role in the Karzai order is about as remote as those of the North Vietnamese being willing to accept Thieu’s authority.

Nor is it simply a case of Karzai reaching an accommodation with the Taliban: Key elements in the Northern Alliance are deeply mistrustful of any deals with the Taliban, and mistrust Karzai — and what they see as his effort to juggle the interests of competing warlords. His regime is brittle, at best, and could easily collapse — particularly because 2014 is also the year in which his tenure expires

Then again, right now the insurgents may be more likely to wait out 2014 and test the proposition that the Karzai regime will be able to defend itself without U.S. forces making the decisive difference — just like the Vietcong did in the period between the Paris agreement and the fall of Saigon.

Related Images;

 


*Link for This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources By Tony Karon - Time (Blog)
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